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ABSTRACT
The Design and Development of an Interactive Story for Security Education: A
Case Study on Password Managers
by
Carlo Sugatan
Chair: Florian Schaub
Password managers allow us to generate unique passwords that ultimately protect
our accounts and improve our password management. Despite being one of the most
common security advice, adaption of password managers remain low. The complexity
and magnitude of security advice leave users pondering about the best decision to
keep themselves safe online. Indeed, it is generally better to learn concepts through
a feedback loop, where we are informed, make a decision, and ultimately experience
the consequences of our decisions. This feedback loop is absent in the traditional way
security advice is given. In this thesis, I explore the potential of using interactive
stories (Choose-Your-Own Adventure stories) to simulate security consequences to
convey lessons and risks. Through participatory design, survey methods, interviews,
and learning science principles, I developed and validated a comprehensive and effec-
tive interactive story to be used in security education. The results of this thesis show
a promising approach of using interactive stories in the security education ecosystem.
viii
CHAPTER I
Introduction
Given the complexity and multitude of security advice, users struggle to deter-
mine how to stay digitally secure. As online navigation becomes more ubiquitous,
both digital experts and non-experts struggle to understand the risks involved with
online behaviors, leading to poor management of data security [4, 5]. The issue arises
as users struggle to identify the perception of risks and threats of their online be-
haviors. Generally, people best learn concepts through a feedback loop. That is,
we are informed, make a decision, and experience the consequences of that decision.
However, this feedback loop is often absent in information security experiences. It is
easier for users to reject a security advice such as using two-factor authentication if
they never experienced having their personal accounts compromised [6].
In order to effectively simulate security consequences to convey lessons, I propose
using an interactive story (Choose-Your-Own Adventure story). An interactive story
is a form of digital entertainment that positions the reader as a director in which
they may influence a nonlinear narrative. The reader engages with the actions and
dialogues to influence the final outcome of a story [7].
In this thesis, I seek to answer the following research questions:
1
• RQ1: How effective are interactive stories in being used as an educational in-
tervention in order to teach lessons about password managers?
• RQ2: What are effective ways to create a comprehensible interactive story in
order to encourage others to start using a password manager?
While answering these questions, I describe the iterative design process involving
participatory design sessions and user testing (Chapters 3, 5, 6) and identify gaps
in people’s knowledge about password managers (Chapter 4). Finally, I present the
final, validated interactive story that came out of this study.
I conducted a series of sessions with users to develop a comprehensible and effective
interactive story. First in Chapter 3, I ran participatory design sessions with nine users
in which they were tasked to create a storyboard for an interactive story to encourage
others to use a password manager. The results from this study informed the content
of the interactive story. Namely, the characters, narrative, and consequences themes.
The results suggest focusing on the convenience of password managers as well as
focusing on the inconvenience of account lockouts rather than something drastic such
as a hack or data breach.
In chapter 4, I deployed an online survey examining the baseline knowledge of pass-
word managers. This survey helped further inform the interactive story in identifying
the gaps or misconceptions of people’s knowledge surrounding password managers.
The results from this study suggest to focus around correcting mental models of the
security aspect and features of password managers. I shift the focus around teaching
lessons about reusing passwords, and focusing on the benefits of the auto-fill feature.
This study also informed the design decision of integrating a password manager in-
stallation guide in the story to dispel the misconception that installing a password
manager is difficult and technical.
To ensure that the interactive story is comparable to the traditional advice of
password managers typically written in text form, I conducted a systematic liter-
2
ature review on password managers in Chapter 5 looking at behavioral inhibitors,
perception factors, failed adoption reasons as well as password manager text advice
from media outlets. This helped inform how to structure the story by identifying the
main inhibitors and barriers in adoption as well as the phrasing of password manager
advice. Finally in Chapter 6, I conducted an online, cognitive interview to evaluate
the comprehensability of the interactive story. This study helped prove if the inter-
active story was successful in conveying the risks and consequences of not using a
password manager as well as the overall security lesson to improve adoption rates of
password managers.
1.1 Contributions
This work makes several contributions in security education:
• First, I developed and validated a comprehensible and effective interactive story
to be used for security education. This interactive story was created from
the combination of different sessions from real users as well as using learning
science principles in order to inform, educate, and delight readers. In doing so,
I provide a graphical security education material that can be used to train or
teach security lessons.
• Secondly, I provide findings regarding people’s general knowledge and miscon-
ceptions regarding password managers. We found that there are significant
relationships regarding those with password manager experience with perceived
trust, necessity and acceptance, ease of use, cost, risks, and reported features.
This can further inform how password manager advice can be improved by fo-
cusing on these perceived factors in order to correct people’s misconceptions
about password managers.
3
• Lastly, I provide a participatory workshop session as a method in creating inter-
active stories in the context of teaching security lessons. These sessions can be
fully adopted by others to educate users on other security and privacy lessons
such as using two-factor authentication, cyberbullying, and surveillance. The
workshop sessions may also bring up conversations surrounding the security or
privacy topic, which can further improve peoples knowledge of that particular
topic.
4
CHAPTER II
Related Work
I discuss related work on security advice and how security practices are adopted to
understand what factors influence users to act digitally secure. I also present related
work on security education, interactive stories, and learning science to understand
ways they are used in security educational and how they are effective in changing
behaviors.
2.1 Security Advice
There are many factors that influence users’ acceptance and rejection of security
advice which leads to differences in security knowledge, mental models, and online
behaviors [5, 6]. Herley proposed that the rational choice of rejecting security advice
is situated where the costs to adopt a security behavior is greater than the potential
benefit that users can gain [8]. Arguably so, humans, or users, are the weakest
link connecting the security of systems [9]. Intrinsically, security experts remedy
the human link issue with security education [8, 10, 11]. In fact, the US-Cyber
Emergency Response Team (US-CERT) has a page detailing security advice that
ranges from mobile device security to network defense. This page contains 72 links
with 1,000 words on each page of a link [12]. Further, it has been shown that there
is a discrepancy between security behavior of experts and non-expert’s, which affects
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the prioritization of which security advice people should, or can, follow [13]. Indeed,
security experts constantly disagree between what the best security advice people
should implement. Some experts believe core education is needed, while others believe
that users will always choose the unsafe route in making security decisions [11]. It
is difficult to rely solely on advice sources to influence behavior change as users will
rationalize their decisions that will benefit them, which may not often be the best
case [8].
2.1.1 Security Advice Knowledge
Wash’s work in conceptualizing security threats show that regular computer users
decide which security advice to implement into their lives based on practicality. As a
result, if users don’t fully understand the threats of a security risk, they would choose
to ignore the advice that they believe would not help them. This fact calls for more
structured security education interventions where efforts should not only focus on the
recommendations of security advice, but also, at informing users why certain security
advice or decisions are necessary [14].
Redmiles et al. conducted a large-scale empirical analysis of security advice to
investigate users’ security knowledge, behaviors, and beliefs. Users accept security
advice based on the trustworthiness of the advice source while rejecting the ones
that seem too complex. There is also a gap in security behaviors based on users’
socioeconomic background, where they may not receive quality advice and tend to
practice fewer security practices [6]. In fact, less than 25% of security advice are
readable at the standard level which decreases the accessibility of users with lower
technical background or education [15]. The current climate of security advice is
hindered by the lack of consensus, comprehensibility, and and efficacy of security
advice. Therefore, it is important to find ways to effectively deliver security advice
to improve security behaviors across populations.
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2.2 Mental Models of Security Behaviors
There has been numerous research around identifying, understanding, and influ-
encing mental models of security behaviors. It is important to understand people’s
mental models of the Internet in order help experts make decisions in supporting
people’s expectations and understanding of how systems work. This can help inform
education, policies, and even interface design [16, 17]. Several studies have looked at
people’s mental models of the Internet and security in general. Firstly, Wash illus-
trated folk models centered around security threats of home computers while Kang et
al. studied users’ mental models of the internet. Mental models of the internet differ
across educational backgrounds and personal experiences, which reveals differences
in perceptions of security threat and risks [14, 18, 19]. Kang et al. concluded that,
despite the differences in mental models of the Internet, there is no direct relationship
between technical backgrounds and protective actions. However, there is a difference
between awareness and protective actions.
2.2.1 Factors Influencing Mental Models
Wash et al. discovered demographic differences in security beliefs and behaviors.
For example, while older people and people with higher education often practice pro-
tective actions, they believe they are rarely a target of security attacks. Younger
and less educated people, however, are less likely to implement protective actions
regarding viruses and hackers because they feel as if there is nothing they can do to
protect themselves. Vaniea et al. found that the lack of awareness and understanding
prevented some users from updating computers to patch security issues [20]. It also
has been shown that even visual cues and contextual information inform our mental
models. Friedman et al. presented how people’s understanding of web security is
influenced by the lock icon [17]. These different mental models regarding security
creates a division of vulnerability, and therefore, make security education and com-
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munication challenging [14]. While it may not be as important for users to understand
the technical intricacies of how the Internet works, it is imperative for users have a
basic understanding of the potential Internet problems in order for them to identify
consequences of their security decisions [18].
2.3 Influences of Security Behaviors
While learning about security advice and mental models of security behaviors are
important, reviewing factors that influence security behaviors carry the foundation
for this thesis. Multiple studies have focused on how users are influenced in adopting
a security behavior. Rader et al. demonstrated that learning security behaviors rely
heavily on informal learning through experiences, stories, and advice sources because
there are no formal ways to learn these best practices [4, 21]. Rader et al. and
Zou et al. demonstrated how people become cognizant of security-related incidents
based on stories and advice told by family and friends. In addition, these stories
serve as a catalyst to behavior change. These narratives informally teach lessons
within close connections [4, 22]. This is important because the fluid way this type of
information travels helps us find ways to better communicate lessons to help people
make better security decisions [4]. Similarly, Das et al. found that observability and
social sensitivity of other’s security experiences is a compelling trigger to influence
behavior modifications [23, 24]. The observability of other’s experiences not only
encouraged better security behaviors, but also discouraged unsafe ones. For example,
people would be more inclined to use a passcode on their mobile device after seeing
other people implement this practice. Similarly, users will be reluctant to reuse the
same passwords if they’ve heard negative experiences regarding people’s accounts
being hacked [23]. Overall, learning security behaviors rely heavily on the people
around us.
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2.3.1 The Role of Experiences in Security Education
Negative experiences contribute to how users make decisions on what security
practices they should adhere to. For example, Vaniea et al. found that negative
experiences regarding installing updates on Windows computers prevented users to
install new updates, regardless if it was an important update on computer patches for
security. Experience remains as an effective method in teaching lessons. In the secu-
rity space, users rely on others to “indirectly learn what can’t be directly experienced”
[21]. The problem emerges at this lack of experience to effectively gauge the severity
of security risks and consequences. This form of learning becomes difficult as any sort
of feedback is often absent in security-related experiences. We learn best if we are
able to make a decision and observe or experience the consequences of that decision.
Rader demonstrated that users who learned about threats through past experiences
were more motivated to secure themselves compared to those who never experienced
a security-related threat [4, 21]. Security measures should not emerge only when
something goes awry [25]. Prior work has laid foundations in understanding how
users learn and make decisions regarding their security behaviors online. However,
motivating users to follow security advice is difficult if the user faces no threats in
the moment. How do we demonstrate the risks associated with poor online behavior
and management to those who feel no real threat?
2.4 Security Education
Researchers have laid groundwork in security education to motivate users to take
up best security practices to protect themselves online. In this thesis, I look specif-
ically at targeted educational interventions about security education. Methods such
as games, cartoons, comic books, infographics, and a tabletop card game all have
been created to educate users regarding their online behaviors [26–32].
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Games. There are multiple gameful design interactions regarding cybersecurity.
First, there has been many interventions in teaching others how to avoid phishing
attacks. Kumaraguru et al. developed an email-based anti-phising education system
that teaches users how to correctly identify false URLs. This study showed that
security notices weren’t as effective as compared to embedded training on how to
avoid phishing attacks. Additionally, this study looked at learning science literature
to inform the educational game design [27]. Similarly, Asanka et al. looked at key
elements in a game design framework to help users avoid security mishaps through
motivation. They found that perceived threat, safeguard effectiveness, safe guard
cost, self-efficacy, perceived threat, and perceived susceptibility elements should be
added in a game framework to avoid phishing attacks. [26]. Often times, security ed-
ucation approaches focus on theories and concepts. However, interactive pedagogical
strategies can be more effective in influencing security behaviors. Ryoo et al. pro-
posed a security educational environment for security education. In the study, they
created a 3D virtual world simulator that replicated network attacks [33]. Similarly,
Google released a web platform called “Be Internet Awesome” that educates and helps
kids navigate online through a series of mini games that teaches about scams, pass-
words, cyberbullying, and good internet behaviors [34]. On the other hand, there are
physical games that teaches about cybersecurity. Denning et al. created a tabletop
card game centered around cybersecurity that is meant to be used inside classrooms
[32]. Overall, games and media prove to be an effective medium in raising awarness
about security issues as well as influencing safer behaviors.
Comics and Cartoons. A more static approach in security education involves
comics and cartoons. Zhang-Kennedy et al. applied persuasion through instructional
design principles to increase the comprehension and awareness regarding security be-
haviors. The results showed that the visual and interactive components of the comics
aided with the comprehension and understanding of the security topics, which is of-
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ten seen as traditionally boring and dry for some people. Even in other disciplines,
comic books are effective because the graphical nature increases comprehension and
memorization [35]. Srikwan and Jakobsson designed cartoons to improve the under-
standing of security risks with the goal of producing long-term effects of the lessons,
which was fairly effective. More importantly, by designing comics or cartoons, the
advice may reach a wider audience and readership [29]. This shows that there is po-
tential in applying comics in security education in order to teach users about security
behaviors.
Stories. Stories are a unique way of educating others about security lessons.
Several studies have shown this to be effective, especially stories about negative expe-
riences [4, 5, 18, 22, 23, 36]. As shown by Redmiles et al., negative events portrayed
in fictional narratives were effective in teaching about security behaviors. Similarly,
the work on social influence from Das et al. showed that negative experiences were
a common catalyst for conversations about security conversations [23]. Fennell and
Wash conducted a study looking at the emotional impact of stories with regards to
password behavior. They found that participants who reported general feelings of
nervousness or frustration end up changing password behaviors as a result [36]. This
is also supported by the work from Vaniea et al., where they found that negative expe-
riences affect people’s motivations at installing Windows updates [20]. This is useful
because it informs us that the framing of stories to teach security lessons is impor-
tant and effective. Redmiles et al. deployed an entertainment education video (e.g.
edutainment) to observe how this form of security advice delivery may be effective
in changing software updating behavior [37]. Prior work in health education suggests
that this type of narrative is effective for behavior change. For example, some studies
looked at how edutainment videos were successful in reducing drunk driving and the
use of condoms [38, 39]. Finally, Rader et al. conducted a study looking at non-
expert’s sources of information regarding security decisions. They found that these
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information is often communicated through stories, where the stories often influence
non-expert’s security behaviors and decisions [4]. Stories are effective because they
evoke emotion and sociability, which makes lessons easily remembered [40]. Overall,
stories prove the effective ways of communicating security risks. However, how do we
expand this to security education in a formal way?
2.5 Password Managers
This thesis is a case study for increasing awareness and adoption of password
managers through security education. Why password managers? A study from Ion et
al. looked at comparing expert and non-expert security practices. In that study, only
10% of non-experts used a password manager compared to the 45% of experts who do.
In addition, non-experts reported writing and reusing passwords, three times more
than non-experts [13]. The low adoption of password managers is also supported by
Humphries’s work looking at workplace password behaviors [41]. Generally, there are
low adoption rates of password managers among non-experts. Thus, this thesis builds
upon previous work around the low adoption rates of password managers, and find
ways to fill this gap through security education. It is important to understand why
people reject to use a password manager. There has been previous work looking at
this issue.
2.5.1 Usability of Password Managers
Several users brought up the issue with technical knowledge and usability issues of
password managers [42–44]. A study from Chiasson et al. showed that non-experts’
incomplete mental models regarding password managers influenced their misunder-
standing of password manager mechanisms. For example, participants reported that
completing a task, such as generating a stronger password, was easy. However, they
actually failed to complete the appropriate protection mechanism, in which their new
12
passwords were not actually strong nor secure. In addition, findings from Karole et al.
show that the participant’s lack of understanding of password managers influenced
their distrust with the tool. The issue with awareness is common among other stud-
ies, and shows the importance of education and interventions about security tools
[42, 45]. This is also supported by research regarding mental models and making
rational decisions, in which the incomplete mental models or the cost-benefit out-
come surrounding passwords and password managers may hinder overall appropriate
behavior change [8, 14, 18, 19].
2.5.2 Factors Influencing the Adoption of Password Managers
Aurigemma et al. examined the poor adoption rates of password managers, despite
high intentions reported by users. They found that the issues were related to trust,
cost, and threat apathy. Additionally, those who reported high intentions to use a
password manager did not adopt one due to the lack of immediacy and time [45].
This study is important because investigating the high intentions but low adoption
rate of password managers may help find the underlying theoretical and practical
understanding of the poor adoption rates.
Why does a security tool proven to be useful still lack high adoption rates [45,
46]? Many researchers are turning to behavioral change theories to investigate this
issue closely [47]. Using self-determination theory to encourage password manager
adoption maybe useful. In other words, looking at users’ autonomy, relatedness, and
competence may be factors to influence adoption. Alkadi and Renaud conducted an
experiment investigating this and found that if all self-determination factors were
satisfied, then adoption was high. The existing research discussed previously show
us that 1) mental models, 2) experience, 3) security sensitivity, and 4) awareness are
contributing factors in adoption of security tools. In this thesis, we explore ways we
can educate users regarding password managers to increase awareness, correct mental
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models, and simulate experiences through the use of interactive stories.
2.6 Learning Science
In this section, I provide an overview of the motivation of using interactive stories
to simulate security consequences to change behaviors. Additionally, I list out the use
of instructional design principles from the learning science field to look at how this
can inform the design of the interactive story. Learning sciences theory suggests that
games that are goal-oriented, challenging, contextual, and interactive are effective for
teaching [48]. This work shifts the focus on goal-orientation and interaction, which
are just as effective in the context of stories.
2.6.1 Interactive Story
An interactive story, or known as Choose-Your-Own-Adventure story, is a genre
that positions the reader as a director in which they may influence the nonlinear
narrative. Prior work has shown the efficacy in changing behaviors such as improving
asthma control among children or improving patients’ confidence in managing their
hospital stay [49, 50]. In video games or comics, users have no control over the actions
of the characters and may not always agree with the decisions the protagonists make.
While this may be effective in changing some behaviors, it does not fully capture
what it means to experience a security threat. Zou et al. investigated the inaction
of users after the Equifax data breach which reveals that awareness is not enough to
trigger action or modification of security behaviors [22]. Interactive stories around
security contextualizes the learning experience as it simulates what it may feel to
experience a security threat based on the users’ decisions. These types of narratives
evoke psychological responses not typically found in traditional methods [7]. This puts
the reader as a main character with a responsibility to take action. While these stories
and other mediums can have a positive change in people’s behavior and awareness
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of a security issue, how likely will they remain aware of their online behaviors in the
future? As shown by Zou et al., awareness is often not enough to trigger a change
in behavior [22]. To date, interactive stories specifically has not been explored in the
context of simulating security experiences.
2.6.2 Instructional Design Principles
Research has looked at the use of instructional design principles to inform the
design and development of educational materials. Previous studies have shown that
interactive environments are effective training methods and motivational tools [51,
52]. The goal of this thesis is to use interactive stories in order for people to learn
about password mangers, its consequences, and hopefully encourage them to adopt
using one. Thus, I implement these design principles in order to create an effective
interactive story to be used for security education.
Immediate feedback principle. Providing immediate feedback is effective in
learning, especially during knowledge acquisition to correct behavior [53]. Research
has shown that immediate feedback in classrooms and training programs were effec-
tive in learning new skills, behaviors, and even judgement accuracy [54, 55]. The
design of the interactive story takes this principle into use through experiences and
consequences. People who read the interactive story will receive immediate feedback
regarding their choices that impact the ending of the story. Based on the type of end-
ing they choose, all readers will receive a lesson regarding password managers. This
will allow them to understand their choices of security decisions and even correct any
misconceptions about password managers.
Multimedia principle. The multimedia principle states that adding graphics
improves learning overall [56]. The interactive story uses a combination of text and
graphics to convey security lessons about password managers. Levering multimedia
will make the story a more enjoyable read and encourages interactivity with the
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readers.
Conceptual-procedural principle. Numerous research has been done looking
at the effectiveness of games for teaching conceptual and procedural knowledge [51].
A concept is a representation of objects, ideas, and relationships as propositions (i.e.
hacking) [51, 57]. A procedure, on the other hand, are steps in order to achieve
a task or goal (i.e. changing your password) [57, 58]. This principle emphasizes
using conceptual and procedural knowledge in an iterative process to increase learning
[59]. We use this principle in the interactive story showing the concept of password
managers and eventually detailing the steps on how to install and use one. This may
be effective in raising awareness as well as demystifying the notion that password
managers take technical expertise to use and install.
Contiguity principle. The contiguity principle states that the use of written
instruction, or narrative, is most effective when used with pictures contiguously rather
than in isolation [60]. The interactive story naturally has both images and text
concurrently.
Segmentation principle. Segmentation principle states that learning through
multimedia is more effective when it is presented in segments, or rather, when the
content is broken into smaller chunks [61]. The interactive story uses this principle
by going through the password manager setup, showing the process in each step, per
scene, per illustration, at the convenience of the user’s pace. Deeper learning can
occur and in turn, allow readers to fully absorb the content of the story.
Personalization principle. Research has shown that by using a more conver-
sational tone increases learning and retaining information. An example of this is
guiding people through instructional material using "I", "we," "you," and "your"
and making them feel involved in the conversation. [62, 63]. The interactive story
naturally involves the reader, but also uses common and conversational language to
tell the story.
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Reflection principle. Reflecting on the lessons learned after the intervention is
effective in retaining information, and even behavior change [64]. After interacting
with the story, the readers will receive a quick debrief about password managers,
lessons learned, and even ways to get started in installing one.
Story-based agent environment principle. Finally, the story-based agent
principle looks at using characters to help guide readers through instructional mate-
rials. Having characters represented as guides, either visually or verbally, is effective
in motivating people to learn [63]. The interactive story design uses supporting char-
acters to guide the reader in installing and providing facts about password managers.
These instructional design principles help guide the design of the interactive story
in order to raise awareness, reduce misconceptions, and hopefully encourage the adop-
tion of password managers. While there are many ways to measure learning, this
thesis focus on knowledge acquisition, or the ability to extract knowledge from in-
structional materials [65].
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CHAPTER III
Participatory Design
3.1 Introduction
It is important to create an effective storyboard for the interactive story in which
people can enjoy, relate to, or be convinced by. To do this, I conducted participa-
tory design sessions in designing an interactive story. I present the results in this
chapter. The primary objective of the participatory design was to create an effective
story that people would find compelling in adopting a password manager. Partici-
pants were recruited through two groups: 1) those who have had experiences with
password managers and 2) those who don’t. I held three workshop sessions, with
3-4 participants in each with a total of 9 participants. In each session, I presented
lessons about password managers and had participants express their concerns and
opinions about the strengths and weaknesses of password managers, as well as their
general experiences with passwords. Participants were put into groups of two and
were briefed about interactive stories. Participants were given templates to create
their own interactive stories. Each group had the opportunity to share their sto-
ryboards with the group. I analyzed each storyboard for common themes, decision
options, lessons, and consequences. The storyboards were then combined with the
major thematic characters, lessons, and consequences. This formed the basis of the
design of the interactive story.
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3.2 Participatory Design
Participatory design (PD) is a design approach that involves stakeholders in the
design process of a particular product [66]. Prior work has shown the effectiveness
of PD in serious games when users were involved as informants that influenced the
game levels and challenges [67]. In addition, PD allows better game fit, in which user
preferences are considered, which increases game effectiveness. [68]. Hont et al. con-
ducted a study on teens with chronic illnesses and their parents in order to understand
the way they articulate symptoms in order to inform the design of symptom-tracking
tools in pediatric care [69]. Similarly, there also has been work focused on generating
art from crowd-based events and communities [70, 71]. This shows how the use of
artistic storyboards or illustration within participatory design can inform designs and
artifacts. Carroll et al. used participatory design within community informatics in
order to inform decisions and processes within workplace organizations and commu-
nities at large [72]. While different methods within participatory designs are used,
they bring in new perspectives and keep the users as influencers in the decisions and
designs. In this thesis, I use participatory design so that it can inform the interactive
story’s narrative based on participants’ knowledge and background rather than my
own security background or biases.
3.3 Methods
I conducted three workshops with 3 participants in each session throughout Novem-
ber 2019. The study was exempted by the University of Michigan Institutional Review
Board. Below I discuss the recruitment process, workshop procedure, results of the
qualitative analysis, and limitations of this work.
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3.3.1 Procedure
Participants were invited in groups at a time, and were separated by those with
experience using a password manager from those who don’t. This group separation
allowed different conversations about password managers to take place by allowing
me to have a different conversation based on the groups’ experience. For example,
I was able to correct any misconceptions surrounding password managers with the
group with no experience, while I was able to have a conversation about how and
why people started using a password manager with those who have experience. This
allowed participants in both groups to approach the storyboard activity in a more
effective way. Separating the group also ensured that people created stories from
their own experiences and knowledge about password managers, rather than someone
else’s experiences with password managers.
I presented a short introduction about password managers to help participants
understand the context of the security advice. Participants also engaged in a short
activity where they were able to share their personal experiences and opinions about
what they find annoying regarding passwords. In addition, they were told to express
their thoughts regarding the strengths and potential weaknesses of using password
managers. Participants wrote these down on post-it notes and shared aloud to every-
one, where both the participants and I engaged in discussions. This allowed me to
debunk any misconceptions about password managers and emphasize on the benefits
and features that participants have brought up.
Next, I briefed participants about interactive stories through examples and a short
activity in creating interactive stories. See Appendix A for the Participatory Design
Study Materials.
1. Creating characters
2. Choosing your settings
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3. Creating character(s) goals
4. Making decisions and consequences of those decisions
5. Climax
6. Endings (plural!)
Participants were then given a template to create their own interactive stories.
An example of this storyboard template is shown in Figure 3.1. Participants were
also encouraged to draw or use their own methods, however, all participants opted
to use the templates provided to them. Each group had an opportunity to present
their work to everyone, which was recorded for analysis. The full participatory design
workshop is included in Appendix A.
Figure 3.1: Example of PD storyboard
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3.3.2 Recruitment
I recruited participants interested in participating in a session to create an in-
teractive story for an educational training material to promote safer online security
behaviors. Participant recruitment was threefold. First, I sent out a recruitment
message through the University of Michigan School of Information email lists. Sec-
ondly, I posted on online forums and social media posts such as Twitter, Facebook,
Reddit, and Craigslist. Thirdly, I posted flyers around the University of Michigan
buildings. Participants went through a screening process to determine if they have
experience with using a password manager. Participants that were invited to the
sessions were not included in future follow-up research of this study.1 Participants
were compensated $15 for an approximately one-hour workshop session.
3.4 Analysis
The presentation data was analyzed using qualitative content analysis [73]. Since
all of the participants chose the interactive story template, I approached the analysis
in a single method based on the template. First, all the recordings and post-it notes
from the activities were transcribed. Next, each story description, characters, goals,
story options, and consequences were coded. Lastly, I mapped out codes through
affinity diagramming [74] and identified high-level themes of what participants find
would be an effective story line in promoting the adoption of password managers.
3.5 Limitations
This study has several limitations related to the sample size. While recruiting
9 participants were helpful in getting a good set of storyboards, the participants
themselves were mostly educated and were in relatively the same age group. As
1Evaluation Study in Chapter 4.
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shown in Table 3.1, most participants had some sort of college education and were
aged 19 to 28. Recruiting a more diverse set of participants, such as older participants,
may help introduce some mental models in creating a convincing storyboard to adopt
password managers not present in younger, more educated populations.
3.6 Results
In this section, I present the results of the participatory design sessions. First,
I discuss the participant’s demographics and level of experience with using pass-
word managers. An overview of these demographics is shown in Table 3.1. Second,
I present the common themes regarding password annoyances that participants dis-
cussed during the group activity during the workshop session, as well as their thoughts
regarding the benefits and risks of password managers. Third, I discuss the themes
of the interactive story elements such as characters, goals, options, and consequences.
I summarize the themes into the resulting interactive story that was designed in
Chapter 5.
ID Gender Age Educ. Type of PW Manager Used
P1 M 28 M.S. Chrome Password Storage
P2 W 21 S.C. Chrome Password Storage
P3 W 23 B.S. Chrome Password Storage, Apple Keychain
P4 M - B.S. No experience
P5 M 19 H.S. Chrome Password Storage, Apple Keychain
P6 M 26 B.S. Chrome Password Storage, Apple Keychain
P7 W 24 M.S. No experience
P8 W - B.S. No experience
P9 W 24 M.S. No experience
Table 3.1: Workshop Session: Participant Demographics
23
3.6.1 Participants
I recruited 9 participants with a balance between men and women, as well as
password manager experiences. The balance of men and women was helpful in order
to get both perspectives and mental models regarding password managers. Demo-
graphics for the 9 participants are shown in Table 3.1. No participant had experience
with a third-party password manager such as 1Password or LastPass, but rather, use
existing password managers such as Chrome Password Storage and Apple Keychain.
All of the participants have some college education and were relatively young, with
28 years old (P1) being the oldest.
3.6.2 Password Experiences
In this section, I summarize the password experiences that participants expressed
during the workshop session. Every participant had the opportunity to discuss opin-
ions, annoyances, and thoughts regarding their password experiences. These results
are aligned with previous research work as summarized in Chapter 2: Password Man-
agers. Here, I explain these results and how this can help inform the design of the
final interactive story.
Difficulty in remembering and creating passwords A good portion of the par-
ticipants expressed that their main concern was that they have a difficult time remem-
bering all their passwords. P3 mentioned: “It’s annoying trying to remember a one-off
password for an account that I don’t use often. I just use the ‘forget password’ all the
time” P2 mentioned that she always forgets her password on Slack and would use the
email link process every time she tries to login. Many of the participants agreed in
using the ‘forget password’ feature often, but felt like they had no other choice if they
wanted to have unique passwords across multiple accounts without writing it down.
Additionally, all the participants agreed that having unique passwords across de-
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vices is important, however, many sacrifice doing this practice for the sake of re-
membering. One participant mentioned: “People say you need different passwords for
different accounts, so it’s tedious to remember all of them. I forget them (passwords)
instantly unless I write it down.” The issue in trying to create unique passwords
across multiple accounts creates a difficult situation for people, so they end up using
the same passwords for most of their accounts. The issue with password creation and
memorability lies in human memory which shows that it may be useful to rely on
software to manage our passwords [75].
Florencio and Herley stated that an average person may have at least 25 accounts
[76]. Nowadays, this may be much more. Indeed, the expectation to remember and
create 25 or more unique passwords is demanding. A study conducted by Ur et al.
also showed that participants may not be creating the most secure passwords in the
first place [77]. Additionally, Wei et al. showed that people’s passwords often were
related to the type of service or website. For example, creating an account on a music
site will often have passwords related to music [78]. We then cannot expect users to
generate strong, unique passwords all the time.
As seen throughout the participatory design sessions, many participants used this
frustration as the beginning point of their storyboards, in which their characters face
the same dilemma before adopting a password manager. Thus, this design element
help inform the final design of the interactive story.
Adhering to website password requirements Participants expressed concern re-
garding unique passwords, but especially around trying to adhere to different website’s
password requirements. Websites have different password requirements which can
include adding capitalization, numbers, and special characters. Many participants
expressed the frustration because sometimes they would need to include a special
character or a number to a common password they use, in which they would end up
forgetting. Previous research looked at the policies regarding enforced requirements
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for creating passwords [79]. In fact, some studies have shown that password policies
may not be as effective in increasing password security [80, 81]. Indeed, frustration
and forgetfulness will occur if you break people’s password practices to include a spe-
cial character or to meet a specific length [78, 81]. While this finding isn’t present
in many storyboards, the frustration of creating unique passwords is similar. Thus,
noting this frustration will be helpful in the design of the interactive story.
3.6.3 Benefits of Password Managers
In this section, I list out what participants had in mind about the benefits of
password managers. Those without password manager experience speculated what
they think the strengths of password managers are after my short presentation about
password managers. These results will inform the interactive story in emphasizing the
features of password managers to encourage others to try using a password manager.
Convenience using the auto-filling feature Most of the participants expressed
the benefit of using the auto-filling feature of password managers. The auto-filling
feature allows you to have the password manager auto-populate in the necessary fields,
such as your username or email, and password in a click of button. Most participants
loved this feature due to faster logins where it streamlines the login experience and
eliminates the need to type long passwords. This convenience factor is supported by
other research regarding adoption of password managers [42, 82, 83]. In fact, most of
the participants included the auto-filling feature on their storyboards. Therefore, it
is useful in emphasizing this feature in the interactive story.
Eliminating the need to remember passwords Participants eagerly expressed
the convenience of eliminating the need to remember passwords shortly after dis-
cussing how difficult it is to remember multiple passwords. It was evident during the
workshop session that expressing this concern and realizing that this can be solved
26
using a password manager illuminated the benefit of trying a password manager, es-
pecially for those who never used one. As previously stated from the research that
Florencio and Herley conducted [76], most users have 25 or more accounts. By utiliz-
ing password managers, users are liberated from the hassle of remembering multiple,
unique passwords.
Password Generation Most were surprised by the feature of password generation.
None of the participants used a third-party password manager application, and mostly
utilized Chrome Password Storage or Apple Keychain as a password storage, where
they save their existing passwords. Only two participants said they used the password
generator on Apple Keychain. While Chrome Password Storage also allows you to
generate passwords, none of the participants in this study used this feature [84]. This
shows that even users who use a password manager, do not fully understand it’s
features. [44]. However, once informed about the feature of password generation,
participants said their passwords would be more secure since a password manager
would allow them to create unique, complex passwords.
3.6.4 Risks of Password Managers
In this section, I list out the common risks that participants brought up regarding
password managers. Those with and without password manager experience both had
similar concerns with using password managers. This shows that even users who
already use password managers still lack the understanding surrounding password
managers. The study from Chiasson et al. showed that participants were not using
password managers properly, and still maintained bad practices [44]. This finding is
important to emphasize how to use a password manager, rather than just encouraging
others to use a password manager.
Mistrust with Companies The most common concern participants had regarding
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password managers is a general mistrust with what companies are doing with their
passwords. P5 best illustrates this, "What are password manager companies doing
with my passwords and information? I am mostly concerned with my privacy." Oth-
ers had similar concerns regarding where and how their data is being securely stored
in the password managers. Many participants also worry about the vulnerabilities
that of password managers. P3 said, "Password manager databases might be huge
targets for hackers." Another participant brought up the issue when password man-
ager companies disappear, "If a password manager company disappears one day, what
is the protocol for users to gain access to their services?" Additionally, participants
are worried about the uncertainty about their passwords. P2 said "I might feel a lack
of control over my accounts if I don’t know what my passwords are." These findings
align with previous research regarding password manager adoption, citing that secu-
rity concerns and mistrust as common behavioral inhibitors of adoption [42, 82, 83].
The discussion surrounding mistrust was alleviated because I gave a short talk
regarding the security of password managers and encryption. However, I was not
able to address the issue with the feeling of uncertainty around the lack of control
when using password managers.
Usability Issues Most of the participants without experience in using password
managers brought up the issue with usability. Previous studies looked at the us-
ability of password managers, stating that users don’t fully understand how to use
password managers [43, 44]. Interestingly, those with password experiences did not
bring up usability issues. The issues surrounding usability included incompatibility
with operating systems and devices, and the usability of the features such as if the
auto-login always works or is usable.
Single Point of Failure Finally, all participants worry about the issue with having
a single point of failure. Both participants with experience and those without expe-
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rience brought this up. One participant mentioned, "If someone has my master key,
they will have access to all my information". Several research regarding password
manager adoption cite this as one of the more common beliefs that hinders full adop-
tion of password managers [42, 82, 83]. During the workshop session and discussion, I
addressed their concern by speaking about the option of having two-factor authentica-
tion, explaining that the only way you can be compromised is if someone had physical
access to your device and had your master password. I concluded that discussion by
explaining how password managers mitigate high risks such as data breaches, while
making lower risks worse, where if you do reveal your master password to someone
else using your device, then your passwords can be compromised. All participants
agree that this is the trade-off using password managers.
3.6.5 Password Manager Awareness and Adoption from Participatory De-
sign
In this section, I describe the results from the post-session survey that participants
took after the participatory design session. The post-session survey asked participants
about how much the workshop session improved their knowledge of password man-
agers, how likely they would start using a password manager, and when they would
start using a password manager.
Most agree that the workshop session increased their understanding of
password managers. Majority of the participants (7) felt that they have a stronger
understanding of password managers after the participatory design session. No par-
ticipant indicated “Disagree" or “Strongly disagree." Even those with password man-
ager experiences agree that their knowledge around password manager increased.
This shows that the method of using participatory design is useful in engaging and
teaching participants, where they are free to discuss their thoughts and issues while
collaborating with peers.
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Participants were likely to adopt a password manager in the near future
Participants without password manager experience indicated that they will likely
adopt a password manager in the near future. The participatory design was an
effective catalyst to be informed about the benefits of password managers. However,
there is still the gap in streamlining the process and reducing the friction in the
adoption of password managers. The term “near future” is vague. As discussed in
Fagan et al. and Alkaldi et al., people have low self-efficacy and suffer from the
lack of immediacy in adopting a security tool, despite being aware of the convenience
and benefits [83, 85]. Future work can possibly look at including a seamless way of
introducing security tools in workshop sessions in order to increase the likelihood of
adoption. However, this was not the goal of this part of the study.
3.6.6 Interactive Story Elements
In this section, I discuss the major themes of the interactive story elements. I
discuss the main character themes, narratives, decisions, and consequences. These
themes help shaped the final interactive story. In addition, this may be useful for
recreating an interactive story for security education in the future.
Character Themes All storyboards included two characters in some sort of rela-
tionship (i.e. husband and wife, or brother and sister). No storyboard included a
third character. I suspect that the exclusion of a third character may be limited by
the storyboard template, or for the sake of participants in keeping the storyboard
simple. Often, the extra character served to be an agent in guiding and convincing
the main character to adopt a password manager. As seen in learning science edu-
cation through the story-based agent environment principle, involving characters to
help guide readers through instructional materials help with motivation and knowl-
edge acquisition [60]. In addition, this aligns with Redmiles et al.’s study when they
created an edutainment video regarding software updating. In that study, a theme
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they found was the use of a "trustworthy, personified security advisor" to deliver the
security practice and instructions [37]. While this was not presented to the partici-
pants, most used this principle in their storyboards.
Narrative Themes Three storyboards were centered around accessing banks, one
about creating an account, one medical, and the rest around the convenience of shop-
ping online. Overall, the major narrative focuses on the goal to conveniently access
accounts. This theme may reveal the underlying mental model of utilizing password
managers for convenience, which is aligned with previous research studies [42, 82, 83],
where most participants expressed that convenience was a main contributor of adop-
tion of password managers. This finding is important because it may be effective
to showcase how password managers can simplify internet behaviors, rather than
approaching a negative or alarming tone surrounding accounts and passwords.
Consequences Themes Contrasting to the narrative theme, most of the conse-
quences focus on inconvenience. Many referenced consequences around inconvenience
rather than anything drastic like hacking or a data breach. The study on edutainment
by Redmiles et al. saw a similar pattern where participants emphasized on realistic
examples of negative consequences [37]. By showcasing less drastic consequences, I
shift the focus on realistic examples, in which readers may relate to. This may allow
them to reflect on their own behaviors and find ways where they can improve this by
adopting a password manager [64].
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CHAPTER IV
Baseline Knowledge of Password Managers
4.1 Introduction
After the participatory design session, I wanted to investigate people’s baseline
knowledge of password managers in general. This would help further inform the
interactive story to find the gaps or misconceptions of people’s knowledge surrounding
password managers. The survey of the baseline knowledge looked at different aspects
of password manager facts as well as people’s expectations of password managers.
These factors included 1) perceived security, 2) perceived trust, 3) perceived necessity
and acceptance, 4) perceived ease of use, 5) perceived cost, 6) perceived risks, and
7) features of password managers. In this section, I describe the study design of
the baseline knowledge of password manager survey. I list out the the differences of
people’s knowledge based on their password manager experience and the password
manager features most report by participants.
4.2 Methods for Baseline Survey
I deployed a computer-administered, closed-answer survey on Qualtrics to 200 re-
spondents in March 2020 via Prolific [86]. The survey asked about common uses, facts,
and misconceptions about password managers to get a baseline of people’s knowledge.
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See Appendix 2 for the Baseline Knowledge of Password Mangers Study Materials.
The study was exempted by the University of Michigan Institutional Review Board.
Below I discuss the survey development, recruitment process, results of the baseline
survey, and limitations of this work.
4.2.1 Survey Development
Firstly, the survey asked participants if they have used or are using a password
manager. If they had experience with password managers, the survey asked about
their password manager experience: when they started using one, why they started,
and what type of password managers they currently use or have used. Secondly,
the survey queries participants’ perception of password managers. These perceived
questions were phrased as true or false questions and were randomized in the final de-
ployment of the survey. Lastly, the survey asked standardized demographic questions
regarding participants’ age, gender, education level, and income. Additionally, I ask
if they have ever worked in a "high tech" job position to ensure that those responding
to the survey was not biased of highly technical participants. After developing the
questions, I pilot tested the survey to a research group with five responses in order
to improve or modify the survey questionnaire. Some questions were updated and
worded better to reduce confusion and redundancy.
4.2.2 Recruitment for Baseline Survey
I recruited 200 participants for the baseline survey on the Prolific online research
platform [86], which is an online participant recruitment panel used for surveys. For
this study, age (18+) and language (English) were the screening criteria for partici-
pants in Prolific. Participants were compensated $2.00 for their time.
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4.2.3 Statistical Analysis
I present descriptive statistics regarding participant’s demographic information
and baseline knowledge of password managers based on perceived factors. I conducted
a chi-square test to find any relationship between those with or without password
manager experience to the perceived factors. A chi-square compares two variables in
a contingency table to see if they are related or differ from one another [87].
4.3 Limitations of Baseline Survey
I achieved a representative sample of participants in gender and education, how-
ever these survey results are not meant to be representative of the entire U.S. pop-
ulation. This survey may not report exact measures of people’s baseline knowledge
of password managers overall, however, this work still provides a strong foundation
in gathering a preliminary baseline knowledge of password managers. Indeed, future
work can look at getting a wider range of audience to further understand the per-
ceived factors of password managers across the United States. In addition, the results
from this survey are self-reported, which may not reflect the true baseline knowledge
as some questions may have been interpreted differently and is prone to response bias.
4.4 Results of the Baseline Survey
In this section, I present the results of the baseline knowledge of password manager
survey. First, I discuss the participant’s demographics. An overview of the demo-
graphics compared to the census sample is shown in Table 4.1. Secondly, I present
description of password manager experience, that is, when they started using one,
why they started, and what type of password managers they currently use or have
used. Next, I present statistical significance from the chi-square tests looking at the
relationship of those with and without password experiences to the perceived factors.
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Lastly, I present the reported features and implications of these results in the final
design of the interactive story.
4.4.1 Participants
I collected 200 responds on the baseline survey. The demographics of the partici-
pants are shown in Table 4.1. The respondents of the baseline survey is representative
of the U.S. Census sample in gender and education, with slight skew to more educated
respondents on the survey. Overall, 67% respondents have experience with password
managers, while only 36% have never used a password manager. In addition, 86.5%
do not have an IT background, while 13% have an IT background. The percentages
do not add up to 100 because some prefered not to answer this question.
Metric Sample Census
Women, Men, Non-binary 51.0%, 43.5%, 0.4% 51.0%, 49.0%, N/A
Less than high school, High school, 1.5%, 17% N/A, 28.6%
Some college, Associate 21.5%, 7.5% 19.0%, 5.5%
Bachelor’s, Master’s 34.5%, 15.5% 20.6%, 8.5%
Doctoral, Professional 0.00%, 2.5% 1.8%, 1.3%
18-24, 25-34 years 30.7%, 37.6% 9.3%, 14.0%
35-44, 45-54 years 19%, 3.4% 12.6%, 12.7%
55+ years 5.4%, 28.9%
< $20k 20% [10.2%, 19.1%]
$20k - $35k 10.2% [8.8%, 17.7%]
$35k - $50k,$50k - $75k 13.2%, 20.5% 12.0%, 17.2%
$75k - $100k, > $100k 8.8%, 20.5% 12.5%, 30.4%
Table 4.1:
Gender, education, age and income demographics of survey participants
compared to the Census. Statistics from [1–3]
4.4.2 What password managers are people using?
A majority of respondents use an existing password managers such as Chrome
Password Storage and Apple Keychain rather than third-party password managers
such as 1Password or LastPass. This is consistent with participants from the partic-
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ipatory design. I suspect that using in-browser password managers is easier to adopt
since people are already using the application such as Chrome Web Browser or own
an Apple Device. The most common third-party password managers are 1Password,
LastPass, and Dashlane, which is consistent with password manager usage statistics
[88, 89].
4.4.3 Why did they start using a password manager?
The most frequent reasons of adopting a password manager are ease of use, conve-
nience, and to manage passwords. The reason of adopting password managers related
to ease of use and convenience is consistent with previous research studies [42, 82, 83].
Other reasons include the increased security and generation of unique passwords. All
of these findings are also consistent with the study conducted in the participatory
design, where convenience and password generation were the main benefits of using
a password manager. This proves that the factors of convenience, ease of use, and
password generation are important aspects people look at when deciding to adopt a
password manager.
4.4.4 Significance of Perceived Factors
I measured the baseline knowledge in the following aspects: 1) Perceived Secu-
rity, 2) Perceived Trust, 3) Perceived Necessity and Acceptance, 4) Perceived Ease
of Use, 5) Perceived Cost, 6) Perceived Risks, 7) Features. These factors were sum-
marized from previous password manager adoption studies [42, 45, 82, 83]. These
factors help us understand where the knowledge surrounding password manager lies.
Overall, there are significant relationships between password manager experience and
perceived trust, necessity and acceptance, ease of use, cost, and risks. There was not
a significant relationship between perceived security (p = 0.5) and reported features
(p = 0.14).
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Perceived Trust. Overall, most participants trust password managers, where
62% of the participants indicated that “I trust password managers to keep my data
safe.” while only 38% indicated that they trust themselves better in managing their
own passwords rather than using a password manager. There is a significant rela-
tionship between the password manager experience and perceived trust, where more
people without password manager experience do not trust password password man-
agers, (X2(1, N = 200) = 53.78,  = 0.513, p < 0.001). This is consistent with the
findings from Chiasson et al. who found that incorrect mental models regarding men-
tal models of password managers can hinder their adoption. Non-users are not willing
to hand over their control to a security tool [44]. Lack of trust is also consistent in
other password manager studies and the participatory design sessions, where users do
not feel comfortable in storing their passwords in one place [42, 45, 83]. An interesting
finding is that many participants mentioned how they are not aware about how their
passwords are being stored or what the company is doing with their passwords. This
opens an opportunity to showcase in the interactive story that trust is an essential
component in password manager companies and that their files and passwords are
actually encrypted and secured.
Perceived Necessity and Acceptance Interestingly, 51.5% of the respondents
prefer to use a password manager over 48.5% of those that indicated they would
rather rely on themselves to manage their own passwords. The split between these
two indicates that for both users and non-users, there is still a large portion who
would prefer to manage their own passwords without a password manager. Indeed,
there is a significant relationship between the password manager experience and per-
ceived necessity and acceptance, where more people without password manager ex-
perience do not feel that they need a password manager to manage their passwords,
(X2(1, N = 200) = 54.89,  = 0.519, p < 0.001). Aurigenna et al. showed that some
of their participants indicated that they were satisfied with their current password
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management system, whether it’s relying on memory or writing it in a physical note-
book [45]. Similarly, the usability of certain password managers hinders long-term
adoption of password managers, as shown by Seiler-Hwang et al. looking at the us-
ability of password managers [90]. While writing passwords down isn’t necessarily the
worst password management practice, it is still important to show value in password
managers. I did not ask for any follow-ups as to why users of password managers still
preferred to manage their passwords without a password manager. Despite this, it
would be interesting to show the consequences in the interactive story to see if the
perceived necessity and acceptance of using password managers changes.
Perceived Ease of UseMost participants indicated that password managers are
easy to use (90%), convenient (91%), and easy to set up (82%). This finding is not
consistent with previous usability studies [44, 90]. This may be because password
managers have improved the usability of their products over time. Another reason is
that many of the participants also indicated that they used browser-based, or built-in
password managers, which are traditionally more simple to use. Interestingly, there is
a relationship between password manager experience and perceived ease of use, where
more people without password manager experience feel that password managers may
not be that easy to use, (X2(1, N = 200) = 54.45,  = 0.517, p < 0.001). As seen in
previous literature as well as in the participatory design sessions, many users decide
to adopt a password manager due to convenience rather than security [42, 83]. For
those who indicated that that they do not think password managers are convenient
nor easy to use may benefit from receiving the experience of the setup process and
the use of a password manager in the interactive story. Therefore, this finding helps
inform why the story should involve a character going through the set-up process to
emphasize convenience.
Perceived Cost While most participants believe that that password managers
are reasonably priced (76.5%), some (23.5%) disagree with this statement. There was
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no significance between income and password manager adoption. The average cost
of third-party password managers are around $2.99 to $4.99 per month with many of
these offering free versions [91–93]. Those who disagree that password managers are
reasonably priced may benefit from using free versions. Free versions often come with
the basic functionalities such as password generation and auto-fills, which should
satisfy the average user. Alkaldi et al. showed that financial cost is not a huge
factor considering there are many free versions of password managers that people can
use. However, they did not report if participants were aware of this [82]. Cost and
prices were never brought up during the participatory design session either because I
informed the participants of the free versions beforehand. Therefore, it is important
to emphasize that financial costs is no bar to people’s adoption.
Perceived Risks More interestingly, most participants, whether users or non-
users indicated that password managers are vulnerable to hackers (65%) and that
if someone hacks into their password managers, all of their hacks will be exposed
(87.5%). In addition, there is a significant relationship between password manager
experience and perceived risks, where more people without password manager expe-
rience feel that password managers are not not safe, (X2(1, N = 200) = 62.20,  =
0.552, p < 0.001). Many other researchers have looked at the security of password
managers, [94–96], signifying potential vulnerabilities of password managers. How-
ever, these studies were conducted about 5 years ago. A recent study by Oesch and
Ruoti showed that many of these password managers, especially app-based one like
1Password and LastPass have significantly improved their security [97]. While vul-
nerabilities still exist, no security tool is fool-proof. An interesting note here is that
87.5% believe that once their password managers have been hacked, their passwords
are compromised. This is a common misconception, since password managers encrypt
the data inside the vaults. If a hacker opens your password manager vault, your data
will by encrypted and safe [42, 97]. This is a great opportunity to emphasize secu-
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rity and misconceptions of risks of password managers, so that people can further
understand the safety in using one.
4.4.5 Reported Features
Figure 4.1: Graph of most and least reported features
Most participants reported that auto-fill, device compatibility, and ability to de-
tect weak and reused passwords as the most common features in a password manager.
Considering that most participants reported convenience as the main contributor of
password manager adoption, it makes sense that auto-fill would be the most reported
feature. Surprisingly, device compatibility is the second most common, but previous
studies have shown that people are unaware of this feature and has been one inhibitor
of full adoption [45, 82]. I suspect that password managers have made it’s presence
known in multiple devices. In addition, considering that many participants from this
survey use Apple Keychain, it’s safe to assume that they may use Apple Keychain on
Apple laptops, tablets, or phones.
Interestingly, the least reported feature include built-in anti-virus, sharing pass-
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words with friends and family, automatically changing passwords, and storing files.
The only fake feature on this list is having password managers automatically change
your passwords, which most participants reported as a false feature. Recently, many
anti-virus software, such as Kaspersky Anti-Virus, are released with built-in pass-
word managers [98, 99]. Sharing passwords with friends and family and storing files
are real features, sometimes at premium versions, of third-party password mangers.
Indeed, most of the respondents use built-in password managers that may not have
these additional features. This finding shows that there are some features that par-
ticipants are not aware of. By educating users about different types of features of
password managers, apart from the common ones, may motivate them to start using
one. Figure 4.1 shows the detailed graph of reported features.
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CHAPTER V
Designing the Interactive Story
5.1 Introduction
The results from the participatory design sessions and baseline knowledge survey
help informed the design and development of the interactive story. In this section,
I present the result of the final version of the interactive story before evaluation. I
use the results of the themes that emerged from the participatory design storyboards
(Chapter 3) such as the character themes, narrative themes, and consequences themes.
In addition, I combine design session results of password annoyances, perceived risks
and benefits with the baseline knowledge survey results (Chapter 4). I identify com-
mon misconceptions and reported features in order to emphasize what lessons should
be learned. In addition, I conducted a literature review regarding password manager
adoption and password manager text advice from media outlets. This helped inform
how to structure the story while maintaining comparability with the text advice and
interactive story. Based on the literature review, I identify the main inhibitors and
barriers in adoption of password managers and the phrasing of password manager
advice. These are then combined with the design sessions and baseline knowledge
survey results. Finally, I use learning science principles (Chapter 2) to inform the
overall structure and methods of designing the interactive story.
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5.2 Procedure for Designing the Interactive Story
In this section, I detail the procedure of creating the final interactive story. I
combine the results and themes that emerged from:
1. Participatory design: Implementing character themes, narrative themes, con-
sequences themes, password annoyances, password risks and benefits. This is
the backbone of the interactive story, in which informs the overall content of
the story.
2. Baseline Knowledge of Password Managers: Implementing common mis-
conceptions, perceived factors (trust, cost, etc.), and reported features. This
informs which type of knowledge surrounding password managers should be
addressed in the story.
3. Common Password Manager Advice: I examined the way text advice
about password managers are framed in media outlets and on the internet in
general. Specifically, I look at if the text advice follow a pattern in addressing
the issues with passwords and if password managers are recommended in a
negative or positive framing. This method is meant to ensure comparability of
the text advice with the interactive story. This informs the flow and framing of
the story.
4. Instructional Design Principles: The learning science literature identified
many types of principles to make educational material effective. I use these prin-
ciples to help ensure effectiveness in teaching a lesson about password managers,
which in turn, to change security behaviors.
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5.2.1 Mapping Password Manager Text Advice
I conducted a literature review as well as collected common password manager
text advice from the media to ensure comparability with the password manager text
advice with the interactive story. In addition, I combine these results with the pass-
word experience that participants discussed from the participatory design. The full
mapping is shown in Figure 5.1. Based on the literature review, I combine the com-
mon reasons of failed adoption of password managers. Next, I combine behavioral
inhibitors followed by perception factors of password managers. Each box correspond
with one another. For example, the reasons of lack of knowledge is related to insuf-
ficient awareness and therefore, perceived necessity and acceptance. The final green
box indicates how the interactive story will solve these issues.
Figure 5.1: Mapping of password manager literature to interactive story flow
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Principle How I implemented this in the interactive story
Immediate feedback
Readers will have the chance to experience their
decisions and consequences in the story. In addition,
they will receive a lesson regarding password managers
so they can understand their security choices.
Multimedia The interactive story has both illustration and text.
Conceptual-procedural
Readers build their conceptual knowledge of password
managers through another character’s mental models.
Next, building procedural knowledge by showing
examples of the password manager features.
Contiguity The text is placed right below the illustration.
Segmentation
The story is separated by scenes, where the readers
will have to click a word or sentence to proceed
to the next scene.
Personalization
The story uses conversational language and in a setting
that is familiar. The use of characters of female and male
characters would appeal for both genders.
Reflection
The ending of the story reflects on the benefits of the
password manager and how the main character benefited
from it. The reader is then forced to reflect on their
choices in the story as well.
Story-based agent
Two supporting characters serve as "security agents"
where they guide the main character through the setting
up the password manager.
Table 5.1: Summary of Instructional Design applied in the interactive story
5.2.2 Developing the Interactive Story on Twine
I developed the interactive story though Twine, which is an open-source tool for
creating and developing interactive stories. Twine is based off of HTML, CSS, and
Javascript. I developed the story using Twine’s Harlowe version 3.1.0 [100]. The final
story was uploaded to Github 1. Figure 5.2 shows a small section of the interactive
story tree decisions.
The final interactive story adopted key elements from the participatory design,
namely:
1. Character Themes: Most of the storyboards centered around two characters,
1https://carlosugatan.github.io/InteractiveStory/MTOP.html
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with one serving as the agent to guide the main character. In the final inter-
active story, there are a total of three characters, one main character and two
supporting characters. Depending on which branch the reader goes to, some
may not see the third character. Readers will only see two characters at a given
time, still sustaining the two-character model.
2. Narrative Themes: Most of the storyboards from the participatory design
focused on convenience, namely convenience accessing accounts. This is consis-
tent with previous findings [42, 83] where most users use a password manager
for convenience. The story focuses on convenience such as managing passwords
and using the auto-fill feature. However, I also wanted to emphasize the security
aspect of it too.
3. Consequences Themes: The storyboards that participants created in the par-
ticipatory design sessions focused on consequences surrounding inconvenience.
Redmiles et al. showed that the consequences should focus on realistic exam-
ples [37]. For the interactive story, the focus looks at financial risk (1st story
branch) or a dodged data breach (2nd story branch). The reason I went with
more a concrete consequence because the point of the interactive story is to
have readers experience the potential harmful consequences, in the hopes they
may adopt a password manager.
5.3 Final Design of the Interactive Story
In this section, I discuss the design decisions and rationale of the final interactive
story. The story was pilot tested by students from the Security, Privacy, and Interac-
tion (SPI) Lab at the University of Michigan School of Information. The story went
through numerous iterations based on the feedback regarding the content of the story,
the effectiveness, the illustrations, and the consequences. The story went through two
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Figure 5.2: Mapping of the interactive story tree decisions on Twine
story and illustration changes. A professional artist was hired to illustrate the scenes.
Some examples are seen in Figures 5.3 and 5.4.
5.3.1 Synopsis
Two rock music enthusiasts, Lesley and Katie, try to purchase concert tickets for
their favorite band, the Mecha Coyotes. Lesley is clumsy and forgetful to a fault, and
forgets her password to purchase tickets on the Rock Music Concert website. Katie
suggests Lesley to start using a password manager to manage her seemingly common
and related passwords. Katie is enthusiastic about password managers and promotes
the convenience and usability, but Lesley remains apathetic. Will Lesley take Katie’s
advice or will she attempt to enter another password, one that she has used since
she was sixteen? What risks will she face and will Katie and Lesley make it to the
concert before the tickets are sold out?
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5.3.2 Story Details
Characters The story involves three characters overall, however, based on the
branch a reader goes to, they may not meet the third character. Readers will only
see two characters at a time. Lesley is the main protagonist while Katie serves as
the security expert. The third character is Lorenzo, who is Katie’s brother. Lorenzo
appears only if the reader chooses to not adopt a password manager and Lesley faces
that consequence. Lorzeno also serves as an agent in being a security expert, in
which he guides Lesley in installing a password manager. Katie has that same role,
but the reader will only see those scenes if the reader chooses to use a password
manager early in the story. The original story had two married couples but many
people expressed that it was not inclusive enough due to the marriage. Instead, the
character design changed into a friendship relationship instead. While there are two
female protagonists, Lorzeno serves as a male character to balance the characters in
the story, which allows the story to appeal for both genders.
Decisions The major decision a reader will make is in the scene where Lesley
is given the option to take Katie’s advice in using a password manager or have her
attempt another login. If the reader chooses to search for a password manager, Katie
will help Lesley set up the password manager, as shown in Figure 5.3. However, in that
same branch, Lesley will receive a notification about discounted concert tickets. The
readers will then be asked to choose whether to continue with the password manager
setup or to purchase the discounted tickets. Purchasing the discounted tickets will
continue to the final scenes where Lesley does not adopt in using a password manager.
If the reader chooses to continue and finish the password manager setup, Lesley will
no longer be able to purchase the discounted concert tickets but is still able to make
it to the concert with Lesley. These decisions allow the readers to reflect on the
decisions while facing trade-offs. The original story looked at purchasing flights to
Italy, but the feedback I received mentioned that this may be more exclusionary since
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not many people felt that the goal to plan a trip to Italy was very realistic to them.
Thus, a more casual event, like a concert, was implemented into the story instead.
Consequences There are two consequences in the story. Both endings show
Katie and Lesley enjoy their time at the concert. If the reader decides to have Lesley
use a password manager, they would receive the good ending in which Lesley finds
out that the Rock Music Concert website she used was hacked but Lesley knew the
rest of her accounts weren’t harmed because she used a different password on the
website. If the reader chose to decline the password manager, they would receive the
bad ending where Katie hacks into Lesley’s account because Lesley mentioned that
the password she used on the Rock Music Concert was the same password she used
across Paypal and shopping sites. This ending showed the financial risks that can
happen if people reused their password across multiple accounts. If the reader sees
this ending, they will still see the password manager setup process because Lesley will
contact her brother Lorzeno, who will help guide her throughout the process. These
consequences will allow the reader to reflect on their decisions while understanding
why these events occurred due to their security choices. The original story emphasized
the bad practice of writing passwords down in a notebook and having that notebook
stolen that would have caused the main protagonist financial consequences. However,
writing passwords down in notebooks is not the worst practice, and many people felt
that having an event like that occur seem a little far-fetched. Therefore, I opted to
have Lesley’s account hacked by highlighting the issue with password reuse, which is
a common problem [42].
Password Manager Installation Guidance The greatest benefit in reading
the interactive story is experiencing the setup process of a password manager. As
seen from previous literature regarding password manager adoption [45, 82], many
people feel as if the setup process of password managers are intimidating, long, and
difficult. However, this is not the case. Therefore, a major design decision was to
include several scenes and illustrations regarding the installation process of password
managers. Specifically, the story goes over 1) what password manager to choose
as well as covering the different price models, 2) choosing a master password, 3) in-
stalling the password manager application on different devices, 4) and generating new
passwords for your accounts. Doing this will allow the reader to be less intimidated
in approaching the installation process, and therefore, increase the chances for them
to start using a password manager in the future.
ConclusionWhile the specific ending may be different for the different branches,
the last scene that concludes the story is shown for both branches. The last scene
summarizes how and why Lesley benefited from using a password manager, further
emphasizing the lessons learned in the interactive story. In addition, the last scene
concludes by showing a list of free and paid password managers such as 1Password,
LastPass, and Dashlane. This reduces the friction in having readers adopt a pass-
word manager. This allows the reader to see the benefits, learn security lessons, and
immediately have the opportunity to accept this advice.
Figure 5.3: Example of one scene from the interactive story
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CHAPTER VI
Evaluation of the Interactive Story
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I present the results from the online evaluation lab study. Ul-
timately, the goal was to pre-test the efficacy of the interactive story in increasing
awareness and comprehension about password managers. Additionally, it aimed to
provide evidence in utilizing interactive stories for security training and educational
resources to assess people’s understanding of the risks of their security choices, secu-
rity tools, and to correct perceptions about their security decisions. Participants were
invited to a cognitive interview where they were free to express any concerns, improve-
ments, and comments regarding the story’s content, lessons, illustrations, and ways
to improve. This evaluation method looked at the knowledge acquisition of the conve-
nience aspect, the security aspect, and the features of password managers. Based on
the findings, the interactive story proved that comprehension about password man-
agers increased. These findings demonstrate that the story is understandable and
effective, which provides a basis to conduct further validation studies in the future
such as an experimental study to compare the efficacy of the validated design of the
interactive story against other modes of security advice.
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6.2 Method for Evaluation Study
I conducted an online cognitive interview in April 2020, where participants were
instructed to “think aloud” as they go through each page of the interactive story
[101]. The cognitive interviewing technique allowed participants to provide insights
regarding their interpretation and comprehension of the interactive story. This was
important to evaluate the comparability with traditional security text advice as well
as to pre-test the story to ensure lessons are effectively communicated .The study was
exempted by the University of Michigan Institutional Review Board. Below I discuss
the interview procedure, recruitment process, results, and limitations of this work.
6.2.1 Procedure
Participants first filled out a screening survey regarding basic demographic infor-
mation. Next, participants were scheduled an online cognitive interview session to
evaluate the interactive story. During the cognitive interview, participants were free
to express their thoughts and opinions regarding the content, lessons, illustrations,
and effectiveness of the interactive story. They were instructed to “think aloud” as
they go through each page of the interactive story. The cognitive interviewing tech-
nique allows participants to provide insights regarding their interpretation and com-
prehension of the interactive story [101]. To test if the interactive story was effective,
participants were asked questions regarding the lessons and consequences presented
in the story. Specifically, they were asked to describe what a password manager is,
how auto-filling works, why it it is important to have unique passwords, and the risks
of reusing password managers.
6.2.2 Recruitment
I recruited for participants interested in an online session reading an interactive
story to evaluate its efficacy in conveying lessons. Participant recruitment was two-
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fold: 1) I posted invitations on Facebook, Reddit, and Discord. 2) A recruitment
message was sent through the University of Michigan School of Information email
lists. Participants were compensated $10 for being a part of the online evaluation
study.
6.3 Analysis
The cognitive interview sessions were audio and screen recorded to capture the
feedback from participants. A qualitative content analysis of the transcripts of the
session was conducted to identify main themes and issues. In this study, I focus on
knowledge acquisition, which describes the process of how new information is absorbed
and stored in memory [102], I tested this by asking participants how well they under-
stood the information they gained from the interactive story. Specifically, I wanted
to see if the interactive story was able to convey the convenience aspect, the security
aspect, and the password generation and auto-fill features of password managers.
6.4 Limitations
This study has several limitations related to the sample size. While eight partici-
pants is a decent number for cognitive interviews [101], I would probably benefit from
having a greater sample size to further test the comprehensibility and comparison
with the baseline knowledge survey.
6.5 Results of Evaluation Study
In this section, I present the results of the comprehension test from the cognitive
interviews. First, I describe the participants’ demographic information and password
manager experience. Next, I present the results of the comprehensibility test. Lastly,
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I present where the interactive story went well and ways it can be improved in future
iterations.
6.5.1 Participants
I recruited 8 participants for the online evaluation study. Demographics for the
8 participants are shown in Table 6.1. Only one participant had experience with a
third-party password manager, which was LastPass. Other participants use Chrome
Password Storage and Apple Keychain. Overall, five (62.5%) participants did not have
experience with password managers. Recruiting for participants without password
manager experience was imperative in order to fully evaluate if the comprehension
from the interactive story was effective. In addition, participants with experience still
benefited from reading the interactive story because third-party password managers,
such as LastPass, have additional features compared to Chrome Password Storage
or Keychain. All but one participants have some college education and the majority
were women.
ID Gender Age Educ. Type of PW Manager Used
P1 M 19 H.S. No experience
P2 W 40 A.S. Chrome Password Storage, LastPass
P3 W 23 B.S. No experience
P4 W 30 M.S. No experience
P5 W - M.S. No experience
P6 M 25 B.S. No experience
P7 W 26 M.S. Chrome Password Storage, Keychain
P8 W 33 M.S. Chrome Password Storage
Table 6.1: Evaluation Study: Participant Demographics
6.5.2 Comprehension Results
Describing what a password manager is All of the participants were able
to articulate what a password manager is, its functionality, and the benefits of using
one. More interestingly, all participants followed a pattern in which they described
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a password manager. The question was broad in which I asked “In your own words,
can you explain what a password manager is?” All participants followed a similar
flow similar to how the media gives advice regarding password managers [88, 89].
Namely, they first described the function of master passwords. They then proceeded
to highlight password storage and creation. Lastly, they discussed features such as
the auto-fill and convenience. The way the participants described password managers
may have been partially influenced by the story, since the story followed a similar flow
and format. If so, the format of interactive stories may have had an effect on how
readers process and understand the information. This shows how the flow of the
scenes in an interactive story is just as important as the content.
All participants were confident in stating that password managers would protect
them as well as keep their passwords safe. P4 stated “So, from what I understand,
the password managers will use some type of encryption technology to keep your pass-
words safe.” After follow-ups, most participants said that the interactive story helped
improve their knowledge and trust with password managers. P2, who already uses
LastPass, said “I like the guidance and illustrations, because it helps other people
understand password mangers. I actually didn’t know that my passwords were also
encrypted, which is relieving to know!” while P7 stated “I don’t know much about
password managers other than the one I use on Chrome, but the story brought up
really good points! I should probably be more careful about how I use mine since I just
store the same passwords on the browser.” This shows that the interactive story was
effective in increasing their knowledge about password mangers, regardless if they
currently do or do not use one. More importantly, the participants brought up their
understanding about how password managers encrypt their passwords. Thus, the
scene where the characters in the story discuss encryption was effective in conveying
this lesson. This is important since previous studies have shown that the lack of
knowledge about this encryption lessens the trust that people have around password
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managers [14, 45, 82].
Auto-fill Feature All participants knew the surface level of how auto-filling works
from previous experience through filling out forms online. P6 mentioned that “If you
told me that password managers had an auto-fill feature, that would be the only reason
why I would use one.” This quote from P6 illustrates the example of how convenience
is still a major factor as to why people would decide to use a password manager, as
seen in from the participatory design (Chapter 3) and previous literature [42, 45, 82].
Four of the participants mentioned that they did not know that password managers
had an auto-fill feature. This shows that the content emphasizing auto-fill in the
story is helpful in raising awareness about the features that users may not be familiar
with.
Some participants mentioned that they don’t actually know how their passwords
are being stored and how the password manager is able to determine which password
to use based on the website. P4 mentioned “I don’t actually know how it’s being stored
in the database. You say it’s encrypted but I think it would be nice to see how that
works.” A next step in the iteration process of the interactive story can look into
explaining the mechanisms of how passwords are stored and how auto-filling works.
This can potentially ease some people’s uncertainty regarding if auto-filling is a safe
feature on password managers.
Unique Passwords and Risks of Reusing Passwords Participants were asked
about the password generation feature as well as the risks of reusing passwords.
Overall, most of the participants understood the risks of reusing password managers.
P6 mentioned “Basically, if one account is compromised, then potentially all your
accounts that have the same password are also compromised” while P7 said “By doing
that [reusing passwords], you make the hacker’s job easy. If one account is hacked,
then all your other accounts can be hacked too.” While participants understand the
risks of reusing passwords, many also feel guilty for still practicing this behavior. P5
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said “It’s actually funny because I still do this! I feel guilty! I should fix my passwords
while P1 says I have my own pattern but sometimes I still use the same one if I
don’t care much about the account. Not surprisingly, this is still a common password
behavior [14, 42]. This proves that interactive stories are effective in conveying these
risks and having people learn how their own security behaviors.
Misuse of Password Managers For those who have experience with password
managers, all the participants do not actually use the full potential of the password
managers. When asked about how they use their password managers, all of the par-
ticipants with experience said that use it solely for password storage. This means that
they still reuse the same password across accounts but allow the password manager to
save their passwords. I asked about the feature on Chrome Password Storage called
“suggested password,” which is a password generation feature. The three participants
said that they don’t use the feature because they fear they won’t remember what that
password is since it is a jumble of letters and numbers. P2 mentions “I don’t really use
the suggested passwords because I wouldn’t know what my password manager would
be. If I need to enter the password, then I wouldn’t know what to do if I don’t have my
password manager with me.” This shows that even people who currently use a pass-
word manager still have incorrect mental models. Thus, the interactive stories still
serves a good purpose in educating and correcting mental models regarding password
managers.
6.5.3 Content and Design of Interactive Story Results
Password Manager Installation Guidance All of the participants appreciated
the password manager installation guidance and felt that it was helpful in understand-
ing the process a bit more. In addition, all the participants felt that it didn’t take
away from the story and was integrated well. However, some felt that the scenes were
text-heavy and felt that it was too long. P4 stated “I really enjoyed the guidance
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from Lorenzo about how to install a password manager, but maybe you can decrease
the text because I ended up focusing on reading the dialogue when the images were
more interesting.” A future change can look at simplifying the steps by creating a
storyboard of the illustration so that readers can visualize the steps in one screen
without having to constantly view each step as a separate scene. This can further
improve the comprehensability of the password manager installation steps.
Trustworthy Agents I also asked participants about the effectiveness of the
support characters in helping the main character install a password manager. The
supporting characters, referred to as security agents, guided the main character in the
process of installing a password manager. Overall, the security agents were effective
in explaining the process of installing password managers, which is consistent with
previous studies showing how secondary characters can help with explaining security
concepts [37]. Interestingly, many participants brought up the conversation surround-
ing who to trust when given a security advice. At first, Katie, who is Lesley’s friend,
suggests her to start using a password manager. In addition, Lorenzo, who is Les-
ley’s brother and an IT manager, also suggested the same thing in a different branch.
Participants mentioned that while they trust both agents, they were more inclined to
trust Lorenzo’s advice because of his IT background. This shows that even in stories,
the source of advice has a significant influence over the person receiving them. This
is consistent with other studies, which shows that people tend to accept security ad-
vice from experts [5, 14, 19]. For future iterations of the interactive story, it would
be useful to emphasize the agent’s expertise and background in order to amplify the
advice about adopt a password manager.
Blaming Characters Interestingly, when asked about the scenario that showed
how the main character reuses passwords, many participants ended up blaming the
main character for the bad practice. P1 says “Well if only Lesley wasn’t so careless
with her passwords, then this wouldn’t have happened to her” while P8 argued that
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“I don’t know if a password manager would have helped Lesley here anyway. She was
just careless with her passwords.” As discussed earlier, some participants reflected on
their own behaviors and felt guilty that they still reuse passwords. However, some
participants chose to blame the main character. This scenario was not conveyed well
and could use a rework in communicating the poor password behavior better. A
potential iteration can look at using statistics to show readers how common certain
password behaviors are so that readers can refrain from outright blaming the character
and introspectively think about their own password behaviors and see if they should
adjust them, allowing them to decide whether or not a password manager is right for
them.
The Use of Animations While all participants enjoyed the illustrations, some
felt that it was too static with the combination of the dialogue and prose content.
P5 said “I really enjoyed the illustrations, they were helpful. But I think you can
probably use animations to make it more lively and easier to follow along. I had
to, like, scroll up and down to read the text and look at the images.” P3 said “I
think using animations will help keep my attention a lot longer. It’s not like I was
bored, but I think using animations can be more effective.” Future iterations of the
interactive story can look into embedding the dialogue into the illustration scene as
talking bubbles and include small animations to keep the interactive story interesting
and alive. This will help with keep the readers’ attention, thus, amplifying the effects
of the lessons and risks conveyed in the interactive story.
6.6 Outlook: Online Experiment
The results from the online evaluation study showed that the interactive story was
successful in increasing the comprehension regarding password managers and security
lessons. The goal was to make the interactive study understandable. This evaluation
study was a necessary precursor for an online experiment that can be conducted in
59
the future investigating if it can work better than security text advice or no advice.
I outline the experimental design that will be conducted for future work.
The experimental design would look to evaluate the efficacy of an interactive story
as compared to regular text security advice. This comparison is important because it
will be used to determine if interactive stories can communicate risks, benefits, and
uses of password managers compared to how this type of advice is typically given.
If this is effective, interactive stories can be used in more interventions to encourage
others to use password managers. Overall, the experimental design seeks to answer
the following questions:
• R1) How effective are interactive stories in increasing intention and adoption of
using password managers compared to traditional text advice?
• R2) Do differences in user characteristics affect the efficacy of interactive stories
in being used for security education?
• R3) Can we predict people’s intention or adoption of using a password manager
based on their current security attitudes and intentions?
Participants will be studied in a between-subjects design and will be randomly as-
signed to one of two conditions which include 1) interactive story group - participants
will be shown the interactive story about password managers, 2) text-advice group -
participants will be shown an article about using password managers. To control for
confounding effects, the co-variable for previous negative experiences with account
compromise will be included.
The experimental design would use existing scales such as:
• Self-Report Measure of End-User Security Attitudes (SA-6) - measures attitudes
about adopting security tools
• Security Behavior Intentions Scale (SeBIS), password subscale - measure par-
ticipants’ intentions of particular security behaviors
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In addition, I would also include psychometric scales such as:
• Need for Cognition Scale (NFC) [103] - measures how likely an individual is to
become involved in a story
• Transportability Scale [104] - measures how much role-taking an individual will
partake in based on a mediated character from a story, movie, or game.
• Identification Scale [105] - measures how much role-taking an individual will
partake in based on a mediated character from a story, movie, or game.
High scores in these psychometric scales predicts attitude change [103–105]. After
10 days, participants will take a survey about the baseline knowledge of password
managers and to provide provide a screenshot of their password manager if they
decided to adopt one. This experimental study will solidify the efficacy for using the
interactive story for security education, and may be more effective in replace some
existing traditional security advice.
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CHAPTER VII
Conclusion
7.1 Discussion
In this section, I discuss the overall results from this thesis. First, I discuss the
main findings from each chapter that ultimately informed the final design of the
interactive story. Next, I discuss the promising approach of interactive stories in
being used in security education. Lastly, I discuss implications of practice in utilizing
interactive stories.
7.1.0.1 Focus on the convenience aspect of password managers
From the participatory design (Chapter 3), we were informed by users about their
negative password experiences. Some of these include the difficulty in remembering
and creating passwords as well as adhering to website requirements. When partici-
pants were tasked to create a storyboard to encourage others to use password manager,
many emphasized on the convenience aspect rather than the security aspect of using
password managers. As supported by the literature, many users indicated that they
adopted a password manager due to convenience [42, 83]. By emphasizing the benefit
of convenience, users are not suddenly alarmed by the vulnerability of their accounts.
In doing so, encourages a smoother transition into password managers rather than
being intimidated in getting started. Related to this finding, the participants from
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the participatory design session focused on the inconvenience consequences if one
decides to not use a password manager. This is supported by a previous study from
Redmiles et al. emphasizing that realistic examples are more effective than extreme
punishments [37]. Future interventions focusing on security practices should look
into providing realistic examples that directly benefit people rather than using scare
tactics for attitude or behavior change. By providing realistic examples, people can
better reflect on their own behaviors and finds ways where they can improve.
7.1.0.2 There are significant differences of the perception and knowledge
of password managers from those with experience using password
managers compared to those without
As shown in the survey looking at people’s general knowledge and misconceptions
regarding password managers (Chapter 5), I found significant differences in perception
and knowledge of password managers from those with experience using password
managers compared to those without. Specifically, we found significant differences
between
• Perceived Trust - People without password manager experience do not trust
password managers
• Perceived Necessity and Acceptance - People without password manager expe-
rience do not think they need to use a password manager
• Perceived Ease of Use - People without password manager experience do not
think that password managers are easy to use
• Perceived Cost - People without password manager experience do not think
password managers are affordable
• Perceived Risks - People without password manager experience do not think
password managers are safe
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These differences emphasize the misconceptions and faulty mental models sur-
rounding password managers, which is also supported by previous studies [42, 83].
As a result, these findings informed the final design on the interactive story by using
these factors to be addressed in the story, namely, to dispel any misconceptions about
password managers. Future security education should look into the general percep-
tion or knowledge surrounding a particular tool or practice in order to focus which
information should be emphasized and addressed.
7.1.0.3 Interactive stories show promise in being used in security educa-
tion
Lastly, through an online cognitive interview (Chapter 6), I show that participants
were able to comprehend the security risks and consequences of not using a password
manager. In addition, participants also saw the potential benefits of using password
managers and the features it has that can aid them with their password management
practices. However, we also see that people who already use password managers
do not use them correctly. Specifically, most still reuse the same password across
different websites and only use password managers to store their existing passwords.
This shows that there is also potential in interactive stories to correct misconceptions
and misuse of security tools.
To date, there has not been a published method in creating interactive stories for
security education. I took the approach of including users into the design because
studies have shown that this is useful in creating effective products or services in
the Human-Computer Interaction field [66–68]. By utilizing participatory design, I
was able to include users into the design of the interactive story, ultimately creating
the core content and narrative of the story. In order to put the interactive story
together, I used the Twine tool, which is an open-source platform to create interactive
stories [100]. Reflecting on this process, it may require additional work in order to
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consistently create security educational materials for interactive stories. I propose
that we create a more seamless and effective means in creating interactive stories
around security behaviors at scale, in which I discuss in Future Work.
7.2 Implications for Practice
Interactive stories show a promising approach as an educational intervention for
security education. Firstly, utilizing interactive stories in education can be effective,
especially for children or teenagers. The multimedia aspect of interactive stories can
be attractive to this population in conveying security lessons, which is often viewed
as boring or intimidating. Depending on the company or organization, this can also
be potentially used as a security intervention or training for employees who are not
aware about password managers. This work is most effective if an organization is
interested in implementing the use of password managers. Indeed, the potential to
simulate security consequences in order to convey lessons and risks is large, but helpful
to push security education in a positive direction.
7.3 Future Work
The research presented in this thesis suggests a number of future research direc-
tions.
7.3.1 Iterations on the current interactive story
Based on the evaluation chapter of this study, the interactive story can go through
more iterations to the artwork and content to improve the overall effectiveness. Such
iterations include creating a more robust and professional artwork with animations,
embedding the dialogue into the artwork, improving the dialogue scenes, and simpli-
fying the installation process scenes.
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7.3.2 Utilizing interactive stories for different security or privacy topics
There are opportunities to expand the interactive story in order to be a dependable
educational material for security and privacy. Future work can look into using a
similar approach of using interactive stories to teach other security or privacy topics
such as two-factor authentication or data breaches.
7.3.3 Creating security and privacy interactive story templates
Generally, this thesis provide the process of developing an interactive story using
participatory design, learning design principles, conducting a literature review, and
using the Twine open-source tool. Another avenue for future work can look at the
different venues of heuristics and templates for creating security and privacy focused
interactive stories. Creating a tool with specific security consequences and lessons,
characters, and artwork can streamline the process in creating interactive stories to
be used for security education in the future. In doing so, we are able to effectively
simulate security consequences to teach lessons at scale, ultimately improving the
nature of security education.
7.4 Summary
Security advice is complex, plentiful, and intimidating to people. I developed and
validated a comprehensible and effective interactive story as a method to be used in
security education. I did this through a series of user sessions, deploying survey to
gather people’s general knowledge and misconceptions regarding password managers,
conducting a literature review, and using learning science design principles in order
to inform the final design of the interactive story.
Taken together, the results suggest that there is a strong potential to use interac-
tive stories to simulate security consequences in order to teach security lessons, and
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ultimately, to change and promote safer security behaviors. In doing so, interactive
stories have a place in the security education ecosystem in order to educate users on
how to behave digitally secure.
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